Privacy protected folders in macOS 27.3

In early October Apple warned that it was urgently reviewing privacy controls for access to protected folders, apparently as a result of the behaviour of AI agents in Meta’s Muse app. Its concern was that granting Full Disk Access to apps like Muse gave them too broad access to anything in a Home folder, including the contents of mail and messages, and that finer granularity was needed in the controls in Privacy & Security settings.

As you may have heard, an initial implementation of this proposed new scheme has been included in the latest beta of macOS Golden Gate 27.3. Although this brings some valuable new features, it’s considerably more complicated and demanding of the user.

Privacy access controls are founded on two principles. First, they aren’t permissions in the normal sense of the term, but are overlaid on conventional Unix-style permissions. If a user doesn’t have permissions to give them access to a folder, then nothing in their privacy settings can override that. Unfortunately, even Apple refers to privacy controls as permissions, which only confuses. I’m repeatedly surprised at the number of experienced users who don’t understand this distinction.

The other and more opaque principle distinguishes between access by intent and access by consent, which determines when and how access is controlled for different locations. Apple’s extensive Privacy site doesn’t appear to make any reference to this, although it had to be explained in detail to developers at WWDC a few years ago. Because many users don’t understand this, they can’t see why apps can open and save documents freely in their ~/Documents folder, but some must obtain their explicit consent before they can access files there. This continues to result in widespread confusion, and I have tried to explain this previously (and on other occasions).

One great advance in this beta of 27.3 is that the user can now add and remove apps in the Files & Folders list, as well as in Full Disk Access. The snag is that doing so is painfully awkward.

For example, to allow a virtual machine to share folders on the host, a virtualisation app has to be given access to those that are controlled by the host’s Privacy & Security settings. Apps currently can’t make claims in their Info.plist or entitlements, so the user has to negotiate a series of privacy dialogs when they first run a VM with shared folders. In macOS 27.3, Apple intends allowing the user to add them manually in Privacy & Security settings first, but that can only be performed one folder at a time.

The result is that many apps (apart from Apple’s) now have to school their users through an onboarding process where they explain how to negotiate the succession of barriers placed by macOS before they do what the user expects. At least Apple is promising to provide a restricted entitlement for apps that perform “disk backup”, to give them Full Disk Access automatically.

Apps that need access to specific folders in ~/Library face an even greater challenge, as the user is expected to select and add each individually. When trying to do that, some folders are disabled, but there’s no distinction made between those without access control, and those to which access can only be granted under Full Disk Access. Without guidance and explicit documentation, that’s even more confusing.

An example of this is Terminal. Without Full Disk Access, it can’t access some folders such as ~/Library/Safari at all, but can be given specific access (by user consent) to ~/Library/Photos. If a user does want to access items in ~/Library, the simplest solution remains to give it Full Disk Access, just as in the past. Apple wanted to make folder access control more finely granular, but doesn’t appear to have devised a simple and efficient way of doing that.

What I haven’t mentioned yet is that Apple is also splitting the current Device Control and Data Access control into System & App Protection Override and Accessibility, which can only complicate privacy protection for other apps.

It now looks as if macOS 27.3 will start to address some of the problems raised by AI agents and Full Disk Access, but until Apple thoroughly rethinks and redesigns privacy access controls, most users are only going to find them more opaque, and harder to use effectively. They need to be redesigned for ordinary users, not security engineers.

It seems ironic that these hurried changes were brought about because of the arrival of AI agents that are claimed to make life easier. If only they had.